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EVALUATING NEW YORK’S NOTICE OF 
CLAIM REQUIREMENTS: WHY NAMING 
INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES IS 
NOT ESSENTIAL 
DANIEL RANDAZZO† 
INTRODUCTION 
In New York, individuals who wish to bring an action 
against a municipality must file a notice of claim.1  A notice of 
claim serves the important function of enabling municipalities to 
investigate claims against them.2  More specifically, it aids 
municipalities in their ability to “locate the place, fix the time 
and understand the nature of the accident” while information is 
still available.3  However, it is currently unclear what exactly is 
required in a notice of claim.4  Courts are split as to whether a 
plaintiff must name individual municipal employees in a notice of 
claim in order to maintain a subsequent action against them, or 
if a notice of claim is sufficiently filed without naming individual 
defendants.5  This issue carries significant consequences for 
plaintiffs in municipal tort lawsuits, as failure to comply with 
notice of claim requirements can result in dismissal of a 
plaintiff’s claim.6 
 
 
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2019, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, State University of New York at 
Geneseo. I would like to thank Professor Patricia Montana for her assistance and 
mentorship as well as the Law Review editors and staffers for all their hard work.  
1 New York State Unified Court System, Filing a Notice of Claim 1 
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/6jd/forms/srforms/ntc_howto.pdf. 
2 See Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000). 
3 Id. 
4 See discussion infra Part II. 
5 See discussion infra Part II. 
6 See New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1. 
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For example, in September of 2008, Jose Alvarez brought an 
action against the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) 
alleging that he was subjected to, among other things, false 
arrest.7  In his notice of claim directed towards the City of New 
York and the NYPD, he did not name any of the individual police 
officers involved in the incident.8  As a result, the court dismissed 
Alvarez’s claim against the officers.9  Similarly, in October of 
2008, Tyrone Blake and Dwayne Johnson brought several causes 
of action against the NYPD, including false arrest, and failed to 
name any NYPD officers in their notice of claim.10  The court 
here, in contrast to Alvarez, did not dismiss Blake and Johnson’s 
action against individual officers, despite their failure to name 
officers in their notice of claim.11  Thus, while failure to name 
NYPD officers was of no consequence for Blake and Johnson, the 
omission of individual defendants’ names was fatal to Alvarez’s 
lawsuit against the employees. 
In March of 2013, the Fourth Department created a 
department split with the First Department on the issue of 
whether individual employees must be named in a notice of 
claim.12 In Goodwin v. Pretorius, the Fourth Department held 
that New York General Municipal Law § 50-e does not mandate 
that individual employees be named in a notice of claim.13  The 
Fourth Department departed from precedent in determining that 
the text and purpose of the statute compel this conclusion.14  On 
the other hand, in 2006, the First Department asserted that 
individual municipal employees must be named in a notice of 
claim in Tannenbaum v. City of New York.15 
This Note argues that the approach adopted by the Fourth 
Department in Goodwin—that General Municipal Law § 50-e 
does not require the naming of individual municipal employees—
is the correct approach in terms of the text of the statute and the 
 
7 Alvarez v. City of New York, 134 A.D.3d 599, 599, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362, 362 (1st 
Dep’t 2015). 
8 Id. at 599–600, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 362. 
9 Id. at 606–07, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367. 
10 Blake v. City of New York, 148 A.D.3d 1101, 1102–05, 51 N.Y.S.3d 540, 542–
44 (2d Dep’t 2017). 
11 Id. at 1106, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 545. 
12 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
13 Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 546 (4th Dep’t 
2013). 
14 Id. at 210–16, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 542–46. 
15 Tannenbaum v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 357, 358, 819 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5–6 
(1st Dep’t 2006). 
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purpose behind the statute, as well as policy and practical 
implications.  This Note is comprised of four parts.  Part I 
illustrates the importance of the notice of claim requirement and 
introduces the text of New York General Municipal Law § 50-
e(2).  Part II provides a synopsis of the case law on both sides of 
this issue, in both New York State courts and federal courts 
interpreting New York law.  Part III analyzes why the Goodwin 
approach is preferable to the Tannenbaum approach based on the 
text of the statute, the purpose behind it, and various policy and 
practical outcomes.  Part IV evaluates a proposed amendment to 
the statute that attempts to strike a balance between the two 
views and explains why it does not efficiently solve the naming 
requirement issue.  For a variety of reasons, New York and 
federal courts should adopt the Goodwin approach going forward. 
I. THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT IN NEW YORK 
A. The Importance of the Notice of Claim Requirement 
The costs associated with personal injury lawsuits against 
municipalities, particularly New York City, have serious 
implications for municipalities and individual citizens.16  New 
York City directs a significant amount of financial resources 
towards personal injury lawsuits.17  The expenses accompanying 
trial, settlement fees, and other costs of legal work are, as a 
general trend, increasing.18  Tort lawsuits have cost 
municipalities billions, from sidewalk slip-and-falls to high-
profile incidents of police brutality.19  For example, New York 
 
16 See infra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
17 John P. Avlon, Sue City, FORBES (July 14, 2009), 
https://www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/new-york-city-tort-tax-opinions-contributors-
john-p-avlon.html (“New York now allocates more taxpayer dollars to settling 
personal-injury lawsuits than it does to parks, transportation, homeless services or 
the City University system.”). 
18 See id. (“the average settlement [as of 2009] was nearly $75,000–up from 
$14,396 in 1984”). But see Dan Rivoli & Reuven Blau, NYC Transit paid $431M to 
settle lawsuits, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nyc-transit-paid-431m-settle-injury-lawsuits-article-1.2806066 (“the amount of 
money doled out due to lawsuits dropped by 13.2% . . . [in 2015], from $99.8 million 
in 2014 to $86.6 million in 2015 . . . [i]t was the first time since 2012 that the figure 
dropped, records show.”). 
19 Zusha Elinson & Dan Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big 
U.S. Cities, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-police-
misconduct-cases-soars-in-big-u-s-cities-1437013834 (“The 10 cities with the largest 
police departments paid out $248.7 million . . . in settlements and court judgments 
in police-misconduct cases [in 2014], up 48% from $168.3 million in 2010”); Elizabeth 
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City compensated tort victims approximately $431 million 
between 2010 and 2015 solely to settle lawsuits from people 
injured by Metropolitan Tranportation Authority trains or 
buses.20  As a result, the cost of handling personal injury lawsuits 
against a municipality falls, in some part, on the individual 
taxpayer.21  Additionally, increased costs of litigation may stifle a 
plaintiff’s desire to bring a tort lawsuit.22 
Even acknowledging a recent decline in tort lawsuits over 
the last three years,23 it is likely that tort lawsuits will continue 
to have similar implications for municipalities and individuals 
going forward, particularly in New York City.24  Millions of 
commuters travel into and out of New York City each day,25 
exposing an enormous population to the possibility of negligence.  
For better or worse, tort lawsuits have an impact on both 
municipalities and their local communities.26 
In light of the costs associated with tort claims and the 
never-ending potential for individuals to bring a tort action, it is 
important to recognize the difficulties that municipalities face in 
defending against these lawsuits.  A notice of claim, which 
supplies municipalities with the information needed to timely 
assess claims against them,27 is of great importance.  Without  
 
 
Kolbert, Metro Matters; A Map to Suing the City, or 6,000 Pages on the Sidewalks of 
New York, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/20/nyregion/ 
metro-matters-a-map-to-suing-the-city-or-6000-pages-on-the-sidewalks-of-new-
york.html (“[e]very year, the city is sued for billions of dollars and winds up paying 
hundreds of millions in settlements,” including sidewalk injuries); see also Avlon, 
supra note 17 (“[s]idewalk ‘slip-and-falls’ cost taxpayers $54 million” in 2008). 
20 Rivoli & Blau, supra note 18. 
21 Lawsuit Lottery: Report Says New York’s Lawsuit Industry Costs Billions, 
Distorts Justice, THE BUS. COUNCIL OF N.Y. ST., INC. (Mar. 25, 1998), 
http://www.bcnys.org/whatsnew/1998/acciddrm.htm (As of 1998, municipal lawsuits 
of all kinds cost New York taxpayers “$14 billion each year, or almost $800 per 
person.”). 
22 Joe Palazzolo, We Won’t See You in Court: The Era of Tort Lawsuits Is 
Waning, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-wont-see-you-
in-court-the-era-of-tort-lawsuits-is-waning-1500930572 (finding that tort lawsuits 
have declined because of the increasing cost of bringing lawsuits, among other 
factors). 
23 Id. 
24 See Kolbert, supra note 19 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how all the defects noted 
by Big Apple could be addressed.”). 
25 See Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports 1.6 
Million Workers Commute into Manhattan Each Day (Mar. 5, 2013) (available at 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-r17.html). 
26 See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
27 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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such a requirement, a municipality would struggle to promptly 
discover the details of allegations against it,28 and be burdened 
by potentially unlimited liability. 
B. The Text of New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) 
With these implications in mind, the way in which plaintiffs 
initiate actions against government entities is a critical first step 
in the process of a lawsuit.   
Anyone who wishes to commence a civil lawsuit against New 
York State, . . . local government (county, city, town, village) or 
most government agencies for damages because of certain 
alleged conduct or negligence must first file with the State or 
municipal government agency a document known as a Notice of 
Claim . . . .29 
New York General Municipal Law § 50-e requires that a notice of 
claim be filed within ninety days after a tort claim arises.30 
There is a debate in New York State courts as to what must 
be included in a notice of claim, and more specifically, “whether a 
plaintiff is required to name individual municipal employees in a 
notice of claim in order to maintain a subsequent action against 
those employees.”31  New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) 
mandates the following regarding the contents of a notice of 
claim: 
The notice shall be in writing, sworn to by or on behalf of the 
claimant, and shall set forth: (1) the name and post-office 
address of each claimant, and of his attorney, if any; (2) the 
nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the place where and the 
manner in which the claim arose; and (4) the items of damage or 
injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then 
practicable . . . .32 
Although the requirements may seem straightforward, some 
courts have required that plaintiffs name individual municipal 
employees in a notice of claim, while most courts have not.33  
Compliance with notice of claim requirements is imperative for a 
plaintiff; failure to meet the requirements typically results in 
 
28 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
29 New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1. 
30 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018). 
31 Kennedy v. Arias, No. 12 Civ. 4166 (KPF), 2017 WL 2895901, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 5, 2017). 
32 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e.  
33 See Kennedy, 2017 WL 2895901, at *12–13. 
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dismissal of the case.34  Thus, this split in New York authority 
and in federal courts interpreting New York law presents an 
issue of vital importance to plaintiffs in municipal tort lawsuits.35 
II. CASE LAW ADDRESSING NAMING INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS IN 
A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
A. When Naming of Individual Defendants Has Been Required 
in a Notice of Claim 
Courts that have held that individual defendants must be 
named in a notice of claim have done so primarily because the 
result is consistent with the overall purpose of General Municipal 
Law § 50-e.36  The fundamental purpose of a notice of claim is to 
provide a municipality with the ability to assess the merits of a 
claim against it.37  A notice of claim featuring the names of 
individual defendants allows a municipality to timely investigate 
the circumstances surrounding a lawsuit before conditions 
change, and while resources such as witnesses are still 
available.38  Thus, an adequate notice of claim, including the 
names of individual defendants, serves to limit the prejudice that 
a municipality would otherwise experience through a delay in 
investigation.39  Additionally, the holding has been supported 
using textualist and plain meaning principles.40 
1. New York State Courts Interpreting General Municipal Law 
§ 50-e(2) 
Some New York courts have held that individual municipal 
employees must be named in a notice of claim, and failure to 
name individual defendants will lead to dismissal of an action 
against them.41  White was the first New York case that 
dismissed a plaintiff’s cause of action against individual 
municipal employees due to a failure to name those employees in 
a notice of claim.42  In that case, the court firmly rejected the 
 
34 See New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1. 
35 See discussion infra Part II. 
36 See discussion infra Parts II.A.I and II.A.2. 
37 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
38 See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
39 See discussion infra Parts II.A.I and II.A.2. 
40 See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
41 See discussion infra Parts II.A.I and II.A.2. 
42 See generally White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 759 
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003). 
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contention that a student’s parents could file a notice of claim 
against a school district, without identifying school district 
employees, and maintain a subsequent action against those 
employees in their individual capacities.43 
First, the court in White began by looking at the statutory 
text and utilizing a “plain meaning” approach.44  Nothing in 
General Municipal Law § 50-e expressly permits directing a 
notice of claim at a municipality and subsequently bringing an 
action against a separate entity.45  The court reasoned that 
“[General Municipal Law § 50-e] certainly does not authorize 
actions against individuals who have not been individually 
named in a notice of claim.”46 
Further, the court in White stated that the plaintiff’s 
argument was “inconsistent with the notice of claim’s 
acknowledged purpose of affording the public corporation the 
opportunity to not only locate the defect, [and] conduct a proper 
investigation, but also to assess the merits of the claim.”47  
Referring to the statute’s purpose, the court emphasized that 
failure to name individual employees does not provide “enough 
information to enable the municipality to adequately investigate 
the claim.”48  The court held that “[w]here the notice of claim fails 
to . . . set forth a theory for imposing individual liability on that 
employee, the municipality has no basis for investigating 
whether or not the claimant has a valid claim against that 
employee.”49 
Moreover, despite the plaintiff’s contention that the school 
district conducted a thorough investigation as a result of the 
notice of claim and became aware of their employee’s actions, the 
school’s actions did not excuse plaintiff’s failure to comply with 
 
43 Id. at 410, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 643. 
44 Id. at 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
46 Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
47 Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644 (citing Carhart v. Vill. of Hamilton, 190 A.D.2d 973, 
974, 594 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep’t 1993)). 
48 Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644 (citations omitted). The court held it was “well 
established” that any claim of liability not put forth in a notice of claim could not be 
maintained in a subsequent lawsuit. Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
49 Id. at 412, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. The court concluded by saying, “[t]hus, 
permitting plaintiffs to prosecute causes of action against individuals who were not 
named in their notice of claim is contrary both to the letter and the purpose of the 
statute.” Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
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the notice of claim requirements.50  Ultimately, based on both the 
text and purpose of the statute, the court granted the individual 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.51 
The first time the White approach was cited at the appellate 
level was in Tannenbaum.52  In that case, the plaintiff alleged 
tort and federal civil rights claims against public officers and 
district attorneys.53  The Tannenbaum court affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the tort claims, which required an adequate 
notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e.54  
Citing to White, the court simply held that “General Municipal 
Law § 50–e makes unauthorized an action against individuals 
who have not been named in a notice of claim.”55  Although 
Tannenbaum did not provide an extensive rationale for its 
holding, it has been interpreted as an adoption of the holding in 
White by the First Department.  Many trial courts and the First 
Department have cited to White and Tannenbaum for the 
proposition that individual municipal employees must be named 
in a notice of claim.56 
 
50 Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (“The school district's efforts to investigate the 
plaintiffs' claims cannot serve as a substitute for compliance with . . . General 
Municipal Law § 50–e.”). 
51 Id. at 413, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645–46. Moreover, “plaintiffs provide[d] no excuse 
for their failure to include the individual defendants in their notice of claim . . . .” 
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645–46. 
52 Tannenbaum v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 357, 358, 819 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (1st 
Dep’t 2006). 
53 Id. at 358–59, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 5–6. 
54 Id. at 358, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 5. 
55 Id., 819 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (citing White, 195 Misc. 2d at 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 641). 
56 See Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d at 217 n.1, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546 n.1 (4th 
Dep’t 2013); Cleghorne v. City of New York, 99 A.D.3d 443, 446, 952 N.Y.S.2d 114, 
117 (1st Dep’t 2012) (holding that the trial court should have dismissed a complaint 
against two school principals entirely because the individual defendants were not 
named pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e and Tannenbaum). Flowers v. 
City of New York, 53 Misc. 3d 922, 933, 41 N.Y.S.3d 360 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2016) 
(holding that an arrestee’s action against individual police officers must be 
dismissed due to failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e); Almas v. 
P.O. Fernando Loza, No. 112379/07, 2011 WL 5118136 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 21, 
2011) (citing to Tannenbaum in holding that “General Municipal Law § 50-c [sic] 
makes unauthorized an action against individuals who have not been named in a 
notice of claim . . . .”); Guzman v. The City of New York, No. 100314/09, 2011 WL 
1360334 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing to Tannenbaum in holding that 
“[t]he notice of claim must identify any City employee against which a plaintiff 
intends to bring a cause of action, and the failure to do so requires dismissal of the 
cause of action”); Martire v. City of New York, No. 106827/2008, 2009 WL 2350276 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. July 20, 2009) (preventing an action from proceeding against a 
police officer who was not individually named in a notice of claim). 
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More recently, in Alvarez v. City of New York,57 the First 
Department reiterated the policies of the Tannenbaum holding, 
finding the reasoning in White more persuasive than approaches 
followed by the Third and Fourth Departments.58  In that case, 
Alvarez brought an action against the NYPD for false arrest; 
however, his notice of claim “did not specifically name any 
members of the NYPD responsible for these alleged acts, nor did 
they contain a generic reference to individual officers such as 
‘Police Officer John Doe’ or any similar language indicating that 
plaintiffs were making a claim against any police officers 
individually.”59  Citing to Tannenbaum and its progeny, a 
plurality authored by Justice Sweeney indicated that “[t]he 
ability to ‘assess the merits of the claim’ is one of the key reasons 
for the requirement of a notice of claim.”60  The court noted that 
although a municipality may have adequate knowledge of the 
events, the same holds true for the plaintiff, and a plaintiff’s 
statutory duties should not be disregarded.61  Because more 
individual defendants were added over time, as had happened in 
Tannenbaum, the City was unable to launch a timely 
investigation.62  This court expressed its concerns by allowing the 
action to proceed: 
To permit such a result raises questions of fundamental fairness 
for the individual defendants, since they were not put on notice, 
even in a generic way by way of “Police Officer John Doe” or 
similar language, that they were going to become defendants.  
Moreover, the prejudice accruing to both the municipal and 
 
57 134 A.D.3d 599, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362 (1st Dep’t 2015). 
58 Id. at 600–04, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 362–66. The court distinguished Alvarez from 
three cases cited by the dissent as inapplicable, unpersuasive precedent, or both. Id., 
22 N.Y.S.3d at 362–66. First, the court distinguished the facts of Alvarez from 
Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4, as that 
case concerned a “defective sidewalk and curb” and did not require the naming of 
individual defendants. Second, the court distinguished Pierce v. Hickey, 129 A.D.3d 
1287, 11 N.Y.S.3d 321 (3d Dep’t 2015), as the plaintiff in that case had knowledge of 
the individual defendant’s name yet inexplicably omitted the name in her notice of 
claim. Additionally, the court treated the Third Department’s holding as persuasive 
precedent and did not feel obligated to follow Pierce. Similarly, the court did not feel 
obligated to follow Goodwin, 105 A.D.3d 207, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, a case dealing with 
medical malpractice. Moreover, the court noted that although service of the notice of 
claim on an employee is waived by statute, failure to name an individual defendant 
is not waived, as Goodwin suggested. Goodwin “did not explain how a municipality 
can undertake an adequate and timely investigation . . . .” 
59 Alvarez, at 599–600, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 362.  
60 Id. at 604, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 366 (Sweeney, J., concurring). 
61 Id. at 605, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 366. 
62 Id. at 606, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367. 
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individual defendants from such a delay is obvious, since 
memories fade over time, records that could have been easily 
obtained early on have been archived, lost or discarded, and 
witnesses may have relocated, just to name a few of the 
potential obstacles.  Delay in investigation and evaluating a 
claim defeats the purpose of GML § 50-e.63 
Thus, the court in Alvarez adhered to the precedent set forth in 
Tannenbaum. 
In dissent, Justice Manzanet-Daniels suggested that the 
statute’s text does not explicitly require naming individual 
defendants.64  Acknowledging the reasoning from the Third and 
Fourth Departments, the dissent asserted that the purpose of the 
statute may be served absent the naming of individual officers.65  
Moreover, the dissent implied that the defendants were in no 
way hindered from investigating the claims.66  Justice Manzanet-
Daniels also cautioned that the court “must not be loath to depart 
from precedent where it cannot be reconciled with the plain 
meaning and purpose of a statute . . . [the court] ought not to 
impose judicially a requirement that is nowhere to be found in 
the statute.”67  One justice concurred in the opinion, conceding 
that while the dissent’s argument was persuasive, he was 
constrained by the precedent set forth in Tannenbaum.68 
 
 
63 Id., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367. 
64 Id. at 608, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 368 (Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissenting). Justice 
Manzanet-Daniels also disagreed with the plurality’s view that because service on 
individual defendants is not required, naming individual defendants is not required; 
one could just as easily argue that because there is no service requirement, there is 
no naming requirement either. Id., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 368. 
65 Id. at 609–10, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369–70. 
66 Id. at 608–09, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369. Particularly in a case involving a false 
arrest claim, “the municipal defendant is uniquely positioned to know the facts of 
any such claim—at a minimum, which officers were on duty and in the vicinity.” Id., 
22 N.Y.S.3d at 369. The officers involved could likely be available to provide 
information. Moreover, Justice Manzanet-Daniels questioned the plurality’s 
assertion that including “John Doe” language would allow the City to gather 
information about an incident of alleged false arrest. Id., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369. 
67 Id. at 610, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 370. The dissent wrote that 
“Tannenbaum . . . imposed a requirement for notices of claim that went beyond those 
enumerated by the General Municipal Law. The requirements for notices of claim 
are in derogation of a plaintiff’s rights and must therefore be strictly construed.” Id., 
22 N.Y.S.3d at 370. 
68 Id. at 607, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367 (Mazzareli, J., concurring). 
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2. Federal Courts Interpreting New York Law 
In addition to New York State courts, many federal District 
Courts interpreting New York Law have embraced the approach 
used by the First Department.69  For example, in Rateau v. City 
of New York, a plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed after 
he failed to name a New York City Department of Information 
and Technology employee in his notice of claim.70  Similarly, in 
Schafer v. Hicksville Union Free School Distict, the court cited to 
White and Tannenbaum in holding that General Municipal Law § 
50-e mandates the naming of individual defendants against 
whom plaintiffs intend to commence a lawsuit.71  Several other 
cases from 2011 and 2012 have held consistent with this 
standard.72 
Subsequently, in 2014, the Southern District of New York 
once again held that suits against municipal employees in their 
individual capacities must be preceded by a notice of claim 
naming the defendants in order to comply with General 
Municipal Law § 50-e.73  Most recently, in May of 2017, in 
Johnson v. City of New York, the court held that, strictly 
construing notice of claim requirements, plaintiff’s false arrest 
and related claims were to be dismissed for failure to name police 
department employees.74  In that case, Plaintiff did not include 
 
69 See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
70 No. 06–CV–4751 (KAM)(CLP), 2009 WL 3148765, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 
2009). 
71 No. 06–CV–2531(JS)(ARL), 2011 WL 1322903, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2011) (holding that a lawsuit against school district employees and an educational 
program’s employees had to be dismissed because student’s parents failed to name 
individual defendants in a notice of claim). 
72 Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 217 n.1, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 546 n.1 (4th 
Dep’t 2013). See DC v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 7:09–cv–9036 (WWE), 2011 WL 
3480389, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (citing to White and Schafer in holding that 
a plaintiff could not assert state law claims against school officials because of failure 
to properly name potential defendants in a notice of claim which must be strictly 
construed); see also Dilworth v. Goldberg, No. 10 Civ. 2224(RJH), 2011 WL 4526555, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s notice of claim was 
insufficient because even though he did name three of the potential defendants, he 
failed to assert any theories of individual liability against them); Alexander v. 
Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 2d 89, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding 
that a school teacher’s lawsuit against three individual school district defendants 
must be dismissed for failure to name individual defendants in her notice of claim). 
73 DiRuzza v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, New York, No. 14 CV 1776(VB), 2014 WL 
6670101, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2014). 
74 No. 15–cv–8195–GHW, 2017 WL 2312924, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2017). 
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“even unnamed individual ‘John Doe’ defendants.”75  Therefore, 
despite the First Department standing alone as the only 
appellate court in New York to currently use the approach from 
White and its progeny, many federal courts have embraced the 
approach originating from White as well.76 
B. When Naming Individual Defendants Has Not Been 
Required in a Notice of Claim 
Courts that have held that naming individual defendants is 
not required by General Municipal Law § 50-e have done so on 
various grounds.77  First, many courts have held that, as a 
textual matter, the statute does not explicitly mandate or require 
the naming of individual defendants.78  Additionally, courts have 
held that the purpose of the statute can be satisfied absent the 
naming requirement.79  Stated otherwise, a municipality can still 
adequately investigate the merits of a claim against it because of 
the other requirements imposed by the statute.80  The approach 
has been justified on policy grounds as well; for example, the 
statute should be construed in favor of plaintiffs because the 
issue concerns a derogation of a plaintiff’s common-law rights.81 
1. New York State Courts Interpreting General Municipal Law 
§ 50-e(2) 
Unlike the First Department, most courts deciding this issue 
have held that failure to name individual municipal employees in 
a notice of claim is not detrimental to a plaintiff’s action against 
those employees.82  The controlling case from the Fourth 
Department, Goodwin v. Pretorius, overturned Fourth 
 
75 Id. Plaintiff in that case argued that the “failure [to name individual 
defendants] should be excused because only through discovery did Plaintiff learn the 
identities of the Individual Defendants. However, Plaintiff failed to provide notice of 
suit against even unnamed individual ‘John Doe’ defendants, and consequently the 
City of New York and the Individual Defendants were not on notice of these claims.” 
Id. Curiously, the court did not cite to Goodwin, Tannenbaum, or White in its 
decision. 
76 For the most part, the federal cases that have decided the issue in this way 
have not provided any substantive or procedural rationale beyond what has already 
been outlined in the New York State courts. 
77 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
78 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
79 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
80 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
81 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
82 See discussion infra Parts II.B.I and II.B.2. 
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Department precedent and created a department split in holding 
that individual municipal employees do not have to be identified 
in a notice of claim.83  The court in Goodwin sharply disagreed 
with the decision of the Renssealaer County Supreme Court in 
White, calling the decision “devoid of any legal authority.”84  
Examining the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis, the 
court nevertheless noted that “[stare decisis] does not apply to a 
case where it can be shown that the law has been misunderstood 
or misapplied, or where the former determination is evidently 
contrary to reason.”85  Even in cases of statutory interpretation, 
in which precedents are “entitled to great stability,” the court 
concluded that precedent may be justifiably overruled when a 
requirement has been judicially created and “goes beyond those 
requirements set forth in the statute.”86  Because the statute does 
not require naming individual defendants, while enumerating 
other specific requirements, one must infer that naming 
individual defendants was intentionally omitted from the 
statute’s requirements.87 
Moreover, the court in Goodwin reasoned that because the 
notice of claim requirement at issue involves a “‘derogation of [a] 
plaintiff’s common-law rights,’ the statute creating such a 
requirement should be strictly construed in the plaintiff’s 
favor.”88  Furthermore, the court looked to language from the 
New York Court of Appeals in determining that “[t]he underlying 
purpose of the statute may be served without requiring a plaintiff 
to name the individual agents, officers, or employees in the notice 
of claim.”89 
 
 
83 105 A.D.3d 207, 213–16, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543–44 (4th Dep’t 2013). Goodwin 
overruled Cropsey v. County Of Orleans Industrial Development Agency. Cropsey v. 
Cty. Of Orleans Indus. Dev. Agency, 66 A.D.3d 1361, 886 N.Y.S.2d 290 (4th Dep’t 
2013). 
84 Goodwin, 105 A.D.3d at 211, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 542. 
85 Id. at 215, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (quoting Kash v. Jewish Home & Infirmary of 
Rochester, N.Y., Inc., 61 A.D.3d 146, 150, 873 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep’t 2009)). The 
court further stated that “in such cases it is the duty of the courts to re-examine the 
question.” Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 545. 
86 Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 545. 
87 See id. at 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546. 
88 Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (quoting Sandak v. Tuxedo Union Sch. Dist. No. 3, 
Town of Tuxedo, 308 N.Y. 226, 230, 124 N.E.2d 295 (1954)). 
89 Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (citing Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 
393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000)).  
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Subsequently, the Third Department in Pierce v. Hickey 
followed Goodwin in holding that a motorist was not required to 
name a county machine equipment operator in order to maintain 
a subsequent action against him.90  The court in Pierce held that 
General Municipal Law § 50-e simply does not require that an 
individual employee be named in a plaintiff’s notice of claim.91  
Dismissal of the complaint was not warranted because, as 
annunciated in Goodwin, the purpose of the statute can be 
satisfied absent naming individual defendants.92 
Additionally, in the recent case of Blake v. City of New York, 
the Second Department agreed with the Third and Fourth 
Departments after recognizing a split in authority.93  After an 
analysis of cases including Alvarez, Goodwin, and Pierce, the 
court simply concluded that “[l]isting the names of the 
individuals who allegedly committed the wrongdoing is not 
required [by the statute].”94  Most recently, in Williams v. City of 
New York, the Second Department cited to Blake as applicable 
precedent after acknowledging a split in authority.95  Thus, a 
majority of the New York appellate authority, the Second, Third, 
and Fourth Departments, agree that naming municipal 
employees is not required in a notice of claim to maintain a 
subsequent action against the individuals as defendants. 
2. Federal Courts Interpreting New York Law 
Many federal district courts have agreed with the 
interpretation of General Municipal Law § 50-e adopted by the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Departments.96  For example, in 
Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, the Southern District of 
New York adopted “the Goodwin Court’s well-reasoned 
conclusion that there is no requirement that individual 
defendants be specifically named in the notice of claim.”97  In that 
case, the estate of a deceased individual brought an action as a 
 
90 Pierce v. Hickey, 129 A.D.3d 1287, 1288–89, 11 N.Y.S.3d 321, 322–23 (3d 
Dep’t 2015). 
91 Id., 11 N.Y.S.3d at 322–23. 
92 Id. at 1289, 11 N.Y.S.3d at 323. 
93 Blake v. City of New York, 148 A.D.3d 1101, 1105–06, 51 N.Y.S.3d 540, 544–
45 (2d Dep’t 2017). 
94 Id. at 1106, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 545. 
95 Williams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d 1301, 1305, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401, 406 
(2d Dep’t 2017). 
96 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
97 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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result of a fatal injury during a police encounter, yet did not 
name individual police officers in a notice of claim.98  Since the 
notice of claim allowed the City to conduct an adequate 
investigation by describing “the specific, date, time, and address 
of the incident,” as well as the alleged facts, “[i]t would then have 
been a straightforward inquiry for the City to determine which 
individuals had been dispatched . . . .”99  Referring to the 
extensive rationale behind Goodwin, the notice of claim allowed 
the City to conduct a thorough investigation; thus, the court 
concluded the plaintiff’s estate should not be penalized pursuant 
to General Municipal Law § 50-e.100  Similarly, in Reyes v. City of 
New York, the Southern District of New York predicted that the 
New York Court of Appeals would follow Goodwin based on the 
court’s analysis in Chamberlain.101 
Federal courts in 2018 have continued to wrestle with this 
issue.102  As a general trend, federal cases decided after Goodwin 
have most commonly found that failure to name individual 
defendants in a notice of claim does not warrant dismissal of a 
plaintiff’s action.103  For example, in the recent case of Russell,104 
the Southern District held that failure to name individual 
defendants did not constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal of a 
plaintiff’s action.105  In December of 2017 and March of 2018, the 
Southern District of New York continued to embrace the 
approach from cases such as Goodwin and Pierce, determining 
 
98 Id. at 373–78, 396. 
99 Id. at 397. 
100 Id. 
101 992 F. Supp. 2d 290, 301–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
102 See Kennedy v. Arias, No. 12 Civ. 4166 (KPF), 2017 WL 2895901, at *12–13 
(S.D.N.Y. July 05, 2017) (recognizing a split in New York appellate authority and 
Federal Court rulings, yet “refrain[ing] from entering the fray given that Plaintiff’s 
state-law claims for assault and battery fail on separate grounds”). 
103 See Matthews v. City of New York, No. 15–CV–2311 (ALC), 2016 WL 
5793414, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016); see also Kennedy v. City of Albany, No. 15–
CV–009491(MAD), 2015 WL 6394513, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015) (estimating 
that the Court of Appeals would find that “individually named officers are not 
required in the notice of claim . . . where the language of the statute does not require 
it” and the purpose of the statute can be served absent the requirement); see also 
Bah v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 6690(PKC)(KNF), 2014 WL 1760063, at *9–12 
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014) (agreeing with Chamberlain and Reyes in determining that 
the Court of Appeals would likely adopt Goodwin, and holding that a notice of claim 
“contained sufficient detail to allow the City to investigate the claim and ascertain 
the identities of John Doe officers”). 
104 Russell v. Westchester Cmty. Coll., No. 16–CV–1712(KMK), 2017 WL 
4326545, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017). 
105 Id. 
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that the New York Court of Appeals would be unlikely to adopt 
the requirement promulgated by the First Department.106  Thus, 
although many federal cases have held to the contrary, the 
greater weight of the more recent federal cases interpreting New 
York law aligns with the Second, Third, and Fourth 
Departments. 
III. NEW YORK SHOULD ADOPT THE GOODWIN APPROACH 
The approach adopted by the Second, Third, and Fourth 
Departments is not only preferable to the First Department’s 
approach, but also brings about a preferable outcome on various 
grounds.  First, the Goodwin approach is a proper reading of the 
text of General Municipal Law § 50-e as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  Second, the purpose of the statute can be fulfilled 
absent the naming of individual defendants.  Third, the Goodwin 
approach promotes desirable policy outcomes, namely fairness 
and protection of a plaintiff’s rights.  Lastly, the Goodwin 
approach results in better practical implications for New York’s 
notice of claim requirements.  Although there are certainly valid 
arguments in favor of the Tannenbaum approach, the Goodwin 
reading of General Municipal Law § 50-e is, overall, the approach 
that should be adopted by New York and federal courts going 
forward. 
 
106 See Garcia v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 11-CV-7258 (KMK), 2017 WL 5633163, 
at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (holding that “[i]n light of the fact that three out of 
the four New York appellate departments have declined to require plaintiffs to 
specifically name each individual defendant as a respondent in the notice of claim, 
and in light of the New York Court of Appeals' directive that ‘[t]he test of the 
sufficiency of a [n]otice of [c]laim is merely whether it includes information sufficient 
to enable the city to investigate’ and that ‘[n]othing more may be required,’ . . . the 
Court concludes that the requirement imposed by the First Department to 
specifically name each individual defendant as a respondent in the notice of claim is 
unlikely to be adopted by the New York Court of Appeals”). The court in Garcia also 
noted with regards to that case that the “notice of claim made clear that it was 
Officer Hess who fired into the windshield of Henry's vehicle, and there can be little 
question that the Village of Pleasantville had ample notice of the need to investigate 
the conduct of Officer Hess.” Id.; see also Joseph v. Deluna, No. 15-CV-5602 (KMW), 
2018 WL 147398, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018). 
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A. Interpreting the Text of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2): the 
Goodwin Approach is the Correct Reading 
When trying to discern the meaning of a statute, the first 
place to start is the text of the statute itself.107  One would surely 
look to the text of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2), entitled 
“Form of notice; contents,” in determining what must be included 
in a notice of claim.108  As mentioned in Part I, the section 
enumerates four requirements: “(1) the name . . . of each 
claimant . . . ; (2) the nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the 
place where and the manner in which the claim arose; and (4) the 
items of damage or injuries claimed to have been 
sustained . . . .”109 
Many courts have accepted the proposition that the text of 
the statute simply does not require the naming of individual 
defendants, and therefore a plaintiff’s claim is not necessarily 
insufficient merely because individual defendants were not 
named.110  After reading the statute, it would seem apparent that 
these courts, which have embraced the Goodwin approach, are 
correct.  The statute does not require the naming of individual 
defendants on its face.  Stated otherwise, nothing in General 
Municipal Law § 50-e compels a plaintiff to name individual 
municipal employees in a notice of claim.  While White, 
Tannenbaum and other courts have read this requirement into 
the statute, it is simply absent from the statute’s text. 
Moreover, not only does the statute omit language regarding 
the naming of individual defendants, if taken in conjunction with 
the fact that the statute contains other requirements, a powerful 
inference can be drawn.  McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New 
York Annotated Statutes § 240 reads, “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius is applied in the construction of 
statutes . . . where a law expressly describes a particular act, 
thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference 
must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended 
to be omitted or excluded.”111  In other words, if the legislature 
mentions items A, B, and C of a particular category, it may be 
 
107 The Writing Center at Georgetown University Law Center, A Guide to 
Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes (2017), http://kacca.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/03/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes.pdf.  
108 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018). 
109 Id. 
110 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
111 N.Y. STATUTES LAW § 240 (McKinney 2018). 
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inferred that the legislature did not intend to include related 
items D, E, and F.112  Numerous cases in New York State courts 
have cited to § 240 in interpreting the meaning of legal text.113  
Indeed, Goodwin addressed this reasoning in one sentence citing 
to a New York Court of Appeals case that quoted § 240.114 
Expressio unius is a canon of negative implication: “[w]ords 
omitted may be just as significant as words set forth.”115  This 
principle of interpretation is intuitive and generally describes 
how people, as well as lawmakers, convey ideas.116  Applied to 
General Municipal Law § 50-e, there is a strong inference to be 
drawn that the New York legislature did not intend to include 
the naming of individual defendants in a notice of claim.  If the 
New York legislature wanted the names of individual municipal 
employees to be included in the statute, they likely would have 
included such a requirement alongside the other enumerated 
requirements. 
The expressio unius canon is not without its limitations, as 
well as some healthy criticism.  For example, this principle is 
heavily dependent on context, and applies when the category 
being specified “can reasonably be thought to be an expression of 
all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved.”117  Moreover, 
the principle has been criticized as unreliable for relying on a 
false assumption that the legislature considered all possible 
items to be included; legislators and others may not think in such 
precise terms when drafting statutory language.118 
 
112 See id. 
113 See id.; see, e.g., Buholtz v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 1071, 319 
N.Y.S.2d 202 (3d Dep’t 1971) (contemplating whether Section 27 of the 
Transportation Corporations Law implied that telephone companies were restricted 
from installing underground lines under private property without an owner’s 
consent, because the statute permits the installation of lines under public land yet 
excludes such language when referring to private property). 
114 Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 545–46 (4th 
Dep’t 2013) (“It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that, where as here 
the statute describes the particular situations in which it is to apply, an irrefutable 
inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be 
omitted or excluded”) (citing Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of 
New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208–209, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
115 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 
AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 668–69 (5th ed. 
2014); see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (2012). 
116 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 115, at 107–08. 
117 See id., at 107 (emphasis in original). 
118 See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 115, at 669. 
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Despite the limitations surrounding expressio unius, the 
canon should still be applied when interpreting General 
Municipal Law § 50-e(2).  “The more specific the enumeration, 
the greater the force of the canon . . . .”119  In other words, the 
more detail that is specified in the statute, the more powerful the 
inference that what is omitted was intended to be left out.  Here, 
§ 50-e(2) requires a claimant’s name, the nature of the claim, the 
time, place, and manner in which the claim arose, as well as the 
injuries suffered.120  One can assume that if the statute mandates 
the inclusion of the claimant’s name, the defendant’s name, if 
required, would have been included as well.  Further, the nature, 
time, place, and manner of the claim are indicative of a 
sophisticated level of detail.  This specific level of detail 
strengthens the notion that defendants’ names were intentionally 
excluded.  For example, if the statute merely required “the 
claimant’s name and the details giving rise to the claim,” the 
argument that naming individual defendants is required would 
be more persuasive because that language would suggest that 
the legislature did not intend to create an exhaustive list.  That 
is not the case here, as the statute enumerates several 
requirements.  Although utilizing this principle does not provide 
iron-clad proof as to legislative intent, it is a helpful tool in 
interpreting the language of the statute. 
Moreover, the White court’s interpretation of the statute—
the origin of the Tannenbaum approach—is unavailing despite 
claiming to utilize a “plain meaning” approach.121  After stating 
that the statute contains no provision permitting actions against 
individuals not named in a notice of claim,122 the court rejected 
the argument that an action could be brought against school 
district officials not named in a notice of claim.123  This reasoning 
is conclusory and inaccurate.  The court in White erroneously 
assumed that because the statute does not expressly authorize a 
course of action, that course of action must violate the statute. 
 
 
 
119 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 115, at 108. 
120 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018). 
121 White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d 
641, 644 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003).  
122 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
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The court in White reasoned further that while the statute 
indicates that service of the notice of claim is not required upon 
individual employees,124 no such exception is made for naming 
individual employees.125  However, one could just as easily argue 
the opposite conclusion.  Perhaps the statute “dispenses with 
service on individual actors because the statute does not require 
that they be named in the notice of claim.”126  Further, the 
exception that service is not required must be read pursuant to 
the sentence that immediately follows it, the only other sentence 
in subsection § 50-e(1)(b).  That sentence requires service if the 
municipality has an obligation to indemnify such person.127  The 
provision indicating service is not required was articulated to 
distinguish typical cases from the instances in which a 
municipality has an obligation to indemnify a defendant.  Thus, a 
structuralist argument that because the statute excuses service, 
it should excuse naming of defendants as well is unpersuasive. 
From a textualist perspective, the statute does not contain a 
requirement that individual defendants must be named.  
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for judges to read in a 
requirement that is not included in the plain language of the 
text.  This is especially true when the statute enumerates other 
specific requirements aside from the naming of defendants.  If 
the legislature wants to amend the statute, they are at liberty to 
do so.  However, absent such an amendment of the statute, 
General Municipal Law § 50-e should not be read to include such 
a requirement. 
B. The Goodwin Approach is Consistent with the Purpose of 
General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) 
In addition to the text of General Municipal Law § 50-e, it is 
helpful to look at the purpose of the statute in evaluating 
whether naming individual municipal defendants is required.  
 
124 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (“Service of the notice of claim upon an officer, 
appointee or employee of a public corporation shall not be a condition precedent to 
the commencement of an action or special proceeding against such person. If an 
action or special proceeding is commenced against such person, but not against the 
public corporation, service of the notice of claim upon the public corporation shall be 
required only if the corporation has a statutory obligation to indemnify such person 
under this chapter or any other provision of law.”). 
125 White, 195 Misc. 2d at 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
126 Alvarez v. City of New York, 134 A.D.3d 599, 608, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362, 368 (1st  
Dep’t 2015) (Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissenting). 
127 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e. 
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Both sides of the debate have cited to a common purpose of the 
statute, but have arrived at different conclusions in individual 
cases.128 
The purpose of the statute requiring persons seeking to recover 
in tort against a municipality to serve a notice of claim on the 
municipality as a precondition to suit is to enable the 
authorities to investigate, collect evidence and evaluate the 
merit of a claim while the information is still available and 
before witnesses depart or conditions change.129 
When looking to the purpose of New York’s notice of claim 
requirements, one of the leading cases cited to is Brown v. City of 
New York.130  In that case, concerning a defective sidewalk and 
curb, the Court of Appeals explained that the notice of claim 
requirement exists “[t]o enable authorities to investigate, collect 
evidence, and evaluate the merit of a claim . . . .”131  Many courts 
on both sides of the debate have agreed with this acknowledged 
purpose of the statute.132  Regarding notice of claim 
requirements, the Court of Appeals said the following after 
quoting the language of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2): 
Reasonably read, the statute does not require ‘those things to be 
stated with literal nicety or exactness’ . . . [t]he test of the 
sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely ‘whether it includes 
information sufficient to enable the city to 
investigate’ . . . ‘[n]othing more may be required’ . . . in 
determining compliance with the requirements of General 
Municipal Law § 50-e, courts should focus on the purpose served  
 
 
 
 
128 See discussion supra Part II. 
129 62A N.Y. JUR. 2D Government Tort Liability § 382 (2018). 
The plain purpose of statutes requiring pre-litigation notice to 
municipalities is to guard them against imposition by requiring notice of 
the circumstances upon which a claim for damages is made, so that its 
authorities may be in a position to investigate the facts as to time and 
place, and decide whether the case is one for settlement or litigation. Thus, 
the requirement furthers the public policy of preventing needless litigation 
and saving unnecessary expenses by affording an opportunity amicably to 
adjust claims against public corporations before litigation is commenced. 
Id. 
130 95 N.Y.2d 389, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2000). Brown has been 
cited by many of the cases discussed herein, including Alvarez and Goodwin. See, 
e.g., supra notes 58 and 89. 
131 Brown, 95 N.Y.2d at 392, 740 N.E.2d at 1079, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 5. 
132 See discussion supra Part II. 
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by a Notice of Claim: whether based on the claimant’s 
description municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the 
time and understand the nature of the accident . . . .133 
Thus, the Court of Appeals has not only defined the purpose of 
the statute but spoke directly to the requirements concerning the 
contents of a notice of claim.134 
Based on this standard, the purpose of the statute can still 
be fulfilled under the Goodwin approach.  Even without the 
naming of individual defendants, the municipality can 
adequately investigate the claim pursuant to the statute’s other 
requirements.  For example, in an action against a police 
department and individual police officers, a common suit brought 
against a municipality, a police department should be able to 
uncover, through an investigation, which officers are being sued 
in their individual capacities.135  A police department can likely 
determine, based on the time, place, and manner in which the 
claim arose, which officers could be potentially involved in the 
claim.136  Similarly, in a case against a school district and school 
employees, the school district can likely ascertain, based on the 
information in the notice of claim, details behind their employees’ 
alleged negligence.137  Given the other specific notice of claim 
requirements, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which failure 
to name individual defendants would leave a municipality 
completely in the dark with regards to the claim giving rise to 
the cause of action.  Additionally, “the purpose of the notice of 
 
133 Brown, 95 N.Y.2d at 393, 740 N.E.2d at 1080, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (emphasis 
added). 
134 See id.; see also Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 
397, 398 (1952) (“The prime, if not the sole, objective of the notice of claim 
requirements of such a statute is to assure the city an adequate opportunity to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of 
the claim while information is still readily available.”). 
135 See Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).  
136 See id. 
137 White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 412, 759 N.Y.S.2d 
641, 645 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003). (“[D]uring the school district’s thorough 
investigation, which continued for months and consisted of numerous witness 
interviews, the school district learned of the negligence of its employees and hence 
none of those employees who are named as defendants in this action can claim that 
they would be prejudiced by not receiving a notice of claim against them within 90 
days of the accrual of the plaintiffs’ claim . . . .”). Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Despite acknowledging this, the court in White still 
concluded that “[t]he school district’s efforts to investigate the plaintiffs’ claims 
cannot serve as a substitute for compliance with . . . General Municipal Law § 50-e.” 
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645. 
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claim requirement is to notify the municipality, not the 
individual defendants.”138  Since the purpose behind the law is to 
enable the municipality to investigate, and nothing more may be 
required,139 it does not follow that the individual employees must 
be put on notice as well. 
Moreover, the argument from some courts such as Alvarez, 
that naming “John Doe” defendants would constitute a sufficient 
notice of claim140 undermines the argument behind the 
Tannenbaum approach.  The court in Alvarez suggested that 
including “Police Officer John Doe” would put the municipality 
on notice and satisfy the statute’s notice requirements.141  
However, to hold that individual defendants must be named, yet 
indicate that “John Doe” language may suffice, is contradictory.  
The inclusion of “John Doe” language provides barely any 
additional information for a municipality to utilize in an 
investigation.  For example, in a claim against a police 
department, “John Doe language will not enable the municipality 
to better identify the arresting officers in the unlikely event the 
City is unaware of their identities.”142  Receiving the time, place, 
and manner of the claim places the municipal organization which 
employs these individuals in a better position, relative to the 
plaintiff, to discover their identities.143  Thus, to assert that the 
inclusion of “John Doe” language would ultimately allow a 
plaintiff’s claim to proceed, when it would otherwise be 
dismissed, defies common sense. 
Although the municipality may experience some form of 
prejudice from a plaintiff not naming individual defendants in 
their notice of claim,144 it is not so significant as to warrant a “do-
or-die” requirement on the plaintiff’s part.  While it is true that 
 
138 Blake v. City of New York, 148 A.D.3d 1101, 1106, 51 N.Y.S.3d 540, 545 (2d 
Dep’t 2017) (citing Zwecker v. Clinch, 279 A.D.2d 572, 573, 720 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d 
Dep’t 2001)). 
139 Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 718 
N.Y.S.2d  4, 6 (2000); see also Rivero v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 204, 208, 48 
N.E.2d 486, 488 (1943) (holding that a notice of claim, which described the exact 
location of alleged negligence on a public road, “was sufficient to enable the city to 
investigate the claim of negligence and nothing more was required”) (emphasis 
added). 
140 See, e.g., supra notes 59, 63, 75 and accompanying text 
141 Alvarez v. City of New York, 134 A.D.3d 599, 605, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362, 366 (1st 
Dep’t 2015). 
142 Id. at 609, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369 (Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
143 See id. 
144 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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memories may fade and information may be more difficult to 
obtain, such is true of any prolonged litigation, and the 
municipality possesses the tools at hand to prevent any delay in 
investigation.145  What matters is not that a plaintiff file a notice 
of claim with “literal . . . exactness,” but rather whether 
“municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the time and 
understand the nature of the accident,”146 which can be satisfied 
absent the naming of particular employees.  This is not to say 
that a plaintiff can bring a suit based on a different theory of 
liability than that alleged in the notice of claim; however, an 
adequate notice of claim will allow a municipality to sufficiently 
investigate a claim and determine whether to settle or proceed 
with litigation. 
C. The Goodwin Approach Results in Superior Policy Outcomes 
when Compared to the Tannenbaum Approach 
Somewhat overlapping with the purpose behind the statute, 
the Goodwin approach is also preferable to the Tannenbaum 
approach as a matter of policy outcomes.  Primarily, the Goodwin 
approach promotes fairness for an individual plaintiff, allowing 
meritorious claims to proceed.  It would be unjust for a claim to 
be dismissed simply because of a formality, when the notice of 
claim otherwise complies with General Municipal Law § 50-e.  
This is especially because, in some instances, it may be 
impractical for plaintiffs to discover the identities of employees 
within the ninety-day period.147  A plaintiff who provides enough 
context and details for the investigatory process to proceed 
should not be punished by having his entire claim dismissed for 
lack of compliance. 
 
 
 
145 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018). The tools at hand being 
the time, place, and manner in which the claim arose, as well as the nature of the 
claim. 
146 Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389. 393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000). 
147 Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 214, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544 (4th Dep’t 
2013) (quoting Schiavone v. County of Nassau, 51 A.D.2d 980, 981, 380 N.Y.S.2d 711 
(2d Dep’t 1976), aff’d, 41 N.Y.2d 844, 362 N.E.2d 252, 393 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977)) (“[o]n 
a purely practical basis, it is obvious that, uniquely in medical malpractice actions, a 
potential claimant may be unable to ascertain the perpetrators of the alleged 
malpractice within the 90–day notice period”). 
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In the 1970s, the New York legislature amended § 50-e “[in 
response to judicial criticism by] . . . mitigating the harshness of 
some of its more stringent provisions.”148  Previously, the Court of 
Appeals highlighted the inequities associated with strict 
enforcement of § 50-e.149  Judge Breitel called for “prompt 
legislative correction of the statute.”150  Rather than serving its 
intended function, strict reading of service requirements created 
“a trap to catch the unwary or the ignorant.”151  Thus, the law 
should serve not to punish unwary plaintiffs who may lack 
expertise in these matters, but to “avoid obvious abuses.”152 
Stated otherwise, the Goodwin approach should prevail 
because this issue implicates a plaintiff’s right to bring a lawsuit.  
“General Municipal Law § 50-e was not meant as a sword to cut 
down honest claims, but merely as a shield to protect 
municipalities against spurious ones.”153  Thus, the statute was 
enacted not to strike down lawsuits that are otherwise valid, but 
to protect from frivolous claims and nuisance suits.  Accordingly, 
a plaintiff who adequately describes the time, place, and manner 
of an event presumably has a good-faith claim and deserves their 
day in court.  Similarly, as mentioned in Goodwin, statutes 
involving a “derogation of [a] plaintiff’s common law rights” are 
to be strictly construed in the plaintiff’s favor.154  This principle,  
 
 
 
148 Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e: Legislature Liberalizes Notice of Claim Requirements, 
51 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 222, 222 (1976). 
149 See id. at n.105. (“[T]he Court of Appeals, in Teresta v. City of New 
York . . . acknowledged the inequities which can result from a literal enforcement of 
§ 50-e. In Teresta, the Court deemed the City to have waived the notice of claim 
requirement when it had examined the plaintiff for his alleged injuries and yet 
failed to object to lack of notice until the eve of trial.”). 
150 Id. (quoting Murray v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 113, 121, 282 N.E.2d 
103, 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9, 16 (1972)) (“Except to the practitioner who is skilled in tort 
cases or claims against municipalities, it is a mousetrap. Such a statute should 
provide a greater discretion to give relief from its requirements and, of course, to 
avoid obvious abuses, set forth the standards for the exercise of that greater 
discretion . . . .”). 
151 Id. (quoting Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397, 
398 (1952)). 
152 Id. (quoting Murray, 30 N.Y.2d at 121, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 
16). 
153 Se Dae Yang v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 140 A.D.3d 1051, 
1052, 35 N.Y.S.3d 350, 352 (2d Dep’t 2016) (quoting DeLeonibus v. Scognamillo, 183 
A.D.2d 697, 698, 583 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (2d Dep’t 1992)). 
154 Goodwin v. Pretorius, 104 A.D.3d 207, 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 546 (4th Dep’t 
2013).  
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originating in English common law and adopted in state court 
jurisdictions, can be used, as it was in Goodwin, to promote 
fairness to plaintiffs.155 
However, this all must be balanced against affording 
fairness to municipalities who need sufficient information and 
time to investigate claims.  A notice of claim must ensure that a 
municipality can satisfactorily investigate without facing unfair 
prejudice that may accrue due to the passage of time.156  
However, concerns over whether a notice of claim without 
individual employees named would be fair to the city are 
baseless.  It is unlikely that a city would be unable to conduct a 
prompt investigation after knowing the nature of the claim as 
well as the time, place, and manner in which the events 
unfolded.157  Likewise, it would be difficult for plaintiffs to bring 
nuisance suits or frivolous lawsuits when there are still several 
specific requirements needed for an adequate notice of claim.  
Therefore, the Goodwin approach strikes the proper balance by 
affording fairness to plaintiffs, whose rights need protection, 
rather than the municipality, who can likely investigate the 
claim irrespective of whether individuals are named. 
D. The Goodwin Approach is Preferable Based on the Practical 
Implications of the Two Approaches 
A final way to assess the impact of the Goodwin approach 
compared to the Tannenbaum approach is to predict the likely 
practical results stemming from each option.  For example, the 
Goodwin approach would permit more cases to go forward as 
cases that otherwise would have been dismissed under the 
Tannenbaum approach would proceed.  However, it is unlikely 
that this increase of cases will negatively burden the court 
system.  Tort lawsuits against municipalities are only one type of 
suit, and, in fact, have declined over the last three years for 
various reasons.158  Thus, the Goodwin approach does not open 
the floodgates to a host of new litigation, but rather allows a 
subset of meritorious lawsuits that otherwise would have been 
 
155 See generally R. Perry Sentell Jr., Statutes in Derogation of the Common 
Law: In the Georgia Supreme Court, 53 MERCER L. REV. 41 (2001). 
156 See 62A N.Y. JUR. 2D Government Tort Liability § 382 (2018). 
157 See Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 412, 759 N.Y.S.2d 
641, 645 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003).  
158 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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dismissed to proceed.  Additionally, it is unlikely that frivolous or 
nuisance lawsuits will persist because the plaintiff still must 
describe the time, place, and other requirements regarding how 
the claim arose.159 
Another practical effect is that the Goodwin approach may 
promote more cooperation between the municipality and the 
plaintiff.  Under the Tannenbaum approach, a municipality may 
be reluctant to ask a plaintiff for additional information 
supplementing his or her notice of claim.  For instance, if a 
plaintiff fails to name individual employees, a municipality is 
incentivized to not make plaintiffs aware of this error, as his 
claims against municipal employees would be destined for 
dismissal.  On the other hand, the Goodwin approach may 
incentivize municipalities to communicate with plaintiffs.  Since 
the plaintiff’s claim against individual employees will proceed 
irrespective of whether individual employees are named in a 
notice of claim, municipalities are less discouraged from asking 
plaintiffs to assist in identifying individual defendants if needed 
for an investigation. 
One negative implication associated with the Tannenbaum 
approach is that it might encourage excessive naming on the 
plaintiff’s part.  A plaintiff may not be able to ascertain the 
names of the alleged tortfeasors.160  When unsure about 
employees’ identities, a plaintiff may err on the side of caution 
and name every police officer, for example, that he can discover 
through the internet and other sources.  Such an action would 
place a burden on the municipality, namely, the municipality 
would have to use resources not otherwise expended in sorting 
through excessive naming.  This would cause confusion at the 
outset of the investigatory process. 
Alternatively, one may question whether one approach has 
any advantageous practical effects over the other approach at all, 
in a typical case.  Under the Goodwin approach, plaintiffs do not 
have to worry about naming individual defendants, yet the 
plaintiffs who easily can will likely name them regardless.  Also, 
in most cases, whether the defendants are named or not, a 
municipality will be able to discern enough information about the 
event because of the requirements that General Municipal Law § 
50-e directly imposes.  However, in many cases, the practical 
 
159 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
160 See Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 214, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544 (4th 
Dep’t 2013).  
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outcome—whether a case will be dismissed or not—is of vital 
importance.161  Thus, the practical effects stemming from the 
Goodwin approach are also beneficial. 
IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT DOES NOT EFFICIENTLY SOLVE 
THE NAMING ISSUE 
A. Pending Legislation: An Attempt to Compromise the Two 
Views 
In 2017, New York State Senator Kathleen A. Marchione 
introduced a bill addressing the exact notice of claim naming 
issue that resulted in the split of authority between the First 
Department and the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments 
outlined in Part II.162  Entitled “Relates to services of certain 
notices of claim,” the bill addresses both a service issue and the 
relevant naming issue.163  The bill proposes to add the following 
language to New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(b) 
regarding the naming issue: 
If an action or special proceeding is commenced against such 
person and against the public corporation itself, the notice of 
claim need not identify the person by name unless: (1) the 
plaintiff knew or with due diligence could have discovered the 
person’s name within the time allotted for service of the notice 
of claim; and, (2) the failure to identify the person by name 
prejudiced the public corporation in its investigation of the 
claim. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the claimant’s 
rights as against the public corporation.164 
Thus, the amendment would create a default in which a 
defendant’s name is not required.  However, naming would be 
required both when naming is reasonably possible and the 
municipality would be prejudiced without doing so.  Specifically, 
the amendment assesses whether “the plaintiff knew or with due 
diligence could have discovered” the municipal employee’s 
 
161 See New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1. 
162 2017 N.Y. S.B. 5097, 240th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). The bill was introduced 
into the Committee on Senate Local Government on March 8, 2017. After going 
through several readings and passing the committee stage, it was placed on the 
senate floor calendar on March 27, 2017. After the bill advanced to the Committee 
on Senate Rules on June 21, 2017, the bill was later referred back to the Committee 
on Senate Local Government on January 3, 2018, failing to advance further. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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name.165  If satisfied, and the municipality can show that it was 
prejudiced in its investigation, the naming requirement will be 
imposed. 
In the Committee Report accompanying the bill, Senator 
Marchione explained her rationale behind the amendment, 
calling it a “compromise” between the Tannenbaum approach 
and the Goodwin approach.166  The Committee Report claims that 
the amendment “strikes a sensible and fair balance between 
competing concerns, and . . . it recognizes that the public 
corporation is best situated to show that it was prejudiced (as 
opposed to the plaintiff having to prove the negative).”167 
B. The Proposed Amendment Does Not Efficiently Solve the 
Naming Issue 
While the amendment seems to directly address the problem 
it does so superficially and in fact raises more issues and creates 
inefficiencies.  Most notably, Senator Marchione’s proposed 
amendment suffers from many of the same deficiencies as the 
Tannenbaum approach.  For example, examining the purpose 
behind a notice of claim, a municipality has the tools to 
adequately investigate a claim against it without any naming 
requirement.168  Similarly, a notice of claim should not serve to 
punish plaintiffs who fail to list names when they otherwise 
provide information that would allow a municipality to 
investigate a claim against it.169  The amendment would also lead 
to undesirable practical outcomes, such as a lack of cooperation 
between the parties and excessive naming on the part of the 
plaintiff.170 
Additionally, Senator Marchione’s proposed amendment 
over-complicates the issue by essentially creating a de facto 
naming requirement for the plaintiff.  Since the plaintiff will be 
charged with anything he could have discovered, it places 
responsibility on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence in naming.  
While the amendment is framed such that naming is not 
required unless the elements are met, it practically becomes a 
requirement for plaintiffs to name the employees or exhaust all 
 
165 Id. 
166 S. 239-5097, 2017-2018 Regular Sessions (N.Y. 2017). 
167 Id. 
168 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
169 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
170 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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reasonable possibilities looking for their names in order to avoid 
the threat of dismissal.  Moreover, there is an additional burden 
on the municipality who now must produce evidence of the 
prejudice that it experienced.  Showing whether a plaintiff has 
knowledge or exercised due diligence, and whether a 
municipality was prejudiced, would lead to a trial within a trial. 
Similarly, Senator Marchione’s proposed amendment is 
inefficient and creates several problems that will result in 
additional litigation.  First, the amendment would require courts 
to dive into the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or what the 
plaintiff could have discovered with due diligence.171  While 
knowledge may be clear in some instances, this unsettling 
proposition would lead to additional disputes as to what 
constitutes due diligence under the circumstances and whether a 
plaintiff could have discovered the defendant’s names.  
Moreover, forcing the municipality to show whether it has 
been prejudiced is equally problematic.  For example, there are 
open questions about the extent of prejudice a municipality 
would need to allege in order to force a plaintiff to name 
defendants.  Thus, the bill raises more questions than it answers. 
While the amendment attempts to strike a balance between 
the two approaches, it would lead to complicated results and is 
not an efficient way to solve this issue.  The Goodwin approach 
remains the preferred solution to this problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The most compelling argument is that New York General 
Municipal Law § 50-e does not mandate the naming of individual 
municipal employees in a notice of claim.  The reasoning for the 
Tannenbaum approach originating from White is unpersuasive.  
Looking at the text of § 50-e(2), listing individual names is absent 
from the statute, which carries a presumption that the 
legislature intended to exclude such language.  Moreover, the 
approach set forth in Goodwin is aligned with the purpose behind 
notice of claim requirements.  And various policy concerns and 
practical implications render the Goodwin approach superior.  
Finally, the proposed amendment, which attempts to compromise 
the two approaches, does not efficiently or logically solve the 
notice of claim issue. 
 
171 2017 N.Y. S.B. 5097, 240th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
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Given the financial liability stemming from municipal tort 
lawsuits, as well as the consequences if plaintiffs fail to comply 
with notice of claim requirements, New York and federal courts 
should adopt the Goodwin approach moving forward.  Thus, the 
New York Court of Appeals should resolve the split of authority 
in favor of the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments. 
 
